In 1939, von Neumann argued for the equivalence of the thermodynamic entropy and −Trρ ln ρ, since known as the von Neumann entropy. Hemmo and Shenker (2006) recently challenged this argument by pointing out an alleged discrepancy between the two entropies in the single particle case, concluding that they must be distinct. In this article, their argument is shown to be problematic as it a) allows for a violation of the second law of thermodynamics and b) is based on an incorrect calculation of the von Neumann entropy. 1 arXiv:1810.09585v2 [quant-ph] 
Introduction
In Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik von Neumann introduces −Trρ ln ρ as the quantum mechanical generalisation of the phenomenological thermodynamic entropy, where ρ is the quantum mechanical density operator 1 . In his argument, he considers the cyclic transformation of a quantum gas confined to a box. By demanding that the overall entropy change of system and heat bath must be zero by the end of the cycle 2 , von Neumann concludes that the entropy of the quantum gas ought to be given by −Trρ ln ρ. Hemmo and Shenker (2006) , however, recently challenged this argument by pointing out an alleged discrepancy between the two entropies in the single particle case, concluding that they must be distinct. In this article I demonstrate that their argument against the equivalence of thermodynamic and von Neumann entropy is erroneous as it a) allows for the construction of a perpetuum mobile of the second kind and thus leads to a violation of the second law of thermodynamics, and b) is based on an incorrect calculation of the von Neumann entropy. The article is structured as follows: after a summary of von Neumann's original argument, I will briefly revisit the debate that has been lead to date by Shenker (1999) and Henderson (2003) before moving on to the main part of this article, in which I analyse Hemmo and Shenker's (2006) most recent contribution.
1 Von Neumann considers two types of processes that describe how the quantum state changes in time. The first, 'Prozess 1', is associated with the probabilistic outcome of a measurement, whereas 'Prozess 2' refers to the evolution of the system via the Schrödinger equation. −Trρ ln ρ is shown to be non-decreasing for both of them.
2 An explicit assumption of the validity of the second law. 3 Notably, von Neumann does not give specifications about the size of the quantum systems inside the boxes K i . However, he regards the boxes themselves as acting like 'molecules'. 4 Mixtures instead of pure states are also conceivable, as long as they are disjoint. rank(ρ) = 2 . A generalisation to n dimensions is straight forward. Orthogonality is a requirement for the existence of semi-permeable membranes that play an important role in von Neumann's thought experiment. Such membranes are permeable to one state but impermeable to another. To complete the setup, another boxK of equal volume V but empty inside, is added to the left ofK. The walls betweenK andK are then exchanged for a semi-permeable membrane of the above kind. It reflects systems in state |− but allows systems in state |+ to pass. From the right hand side of boxK another semi-permeable membrane, permeable for |− -systems but impermeable for |+ -systems, is now quasi-statically pushed in. This way the |+ -systems are 'pushed' into the left box, K . At the end of this process, the previous mixture will be separated into a (+)-and a (−)-gas and the separation will have taken place without performing any work and without any heat exchange with the heat bath.
In the next step, the two boxes are compressed to volumes λV and (λ − 1)V respectively, while keeping the temperature T constant, which changes the densities in the boxes from λN/V and (λ − 1)N/V to the initial density of the gas of N/V , where N is the number of systems, or molecules, and λ depends on the initial constitution of the mixture. For a maximally mixed ρ with rank 2, λ = 1/2, which means that each box will be compressed to half its volume. The |+ -and |− -gases are then reversibly transformed into a |ψ -gas via unitary operations and the partition is removed. During the isothermal compression, the entropy of the heat reservoir increases by N k B λ ln λ and N k b (1 − λ) ln(1 − λ) respectively. Von Neumann argues that since the whole process is reversible, the total entropy change of gas and reservoir must be 0 and since the (normed) entropy of the final |ψ -gas is 0 by definition, it must have been
In a later discussion he also explains that his type 1 process leads to an increase in entropy.
A schematic illustration of the above process can be found in Figure 1 .
We can generalise the above considerations to more dimensions and consider a density matrix ρ with eigenvectors |φ 1 , ..., |φ n and eigenvalues λ 1 , ..., λ n . The entropy is then given by S ρ = −Trρ ln ρ = − n i=1 λ i ln λ i .
Shenker's (1999) Criticism and Henderson's (2003) Reply
I will now briefly consider Shenker's (1999) first criticism against von Neumann's argument and Henderson's (2003) reply. According to Shenker, two assumptions were made by von Neumann: a) the thermodynamic entropy only changes at the compression stage 4 → 5, and The individual particles are each in a superposition |+ and |− , indicated by bicoloured circles.
(2) After the spin measurement, the system is now in a mixed state. The particles are either in spin-up (white) or spin-down (black) states. The partition is removed. In this figure, no heat bath is present, but we can imagine that it exists and takes up the dissipated entropy at 4 → 5.
b) the entropies of stage 1 and 7 are the same.
As Shenker presents the argument, von Neumann's conclusion was that the entropy must have increased during the measurement process at stage 1 → 2, to balance out the decrease at step 4. The discrepancy between the behaviour of the von Neumann entropy and the "classical entropy" 5 allegedly becomes apparent when considering stages 2 to 4. We first consider the change in von Neumann entropy: at stage 2, the system is in a maximally mixed state and therefore has a positive von Neumann entropy. At stage 4, Shenker claims, the system is in a pure state and therefore has zero von Neumann entropy by definition. The von Neumann entropy hence must have decreased between 2 and 4.
"From a thermodynamic point of view" (p.42), however, the entropy has not changed from 2 → 4. This is because "the entropy reduction of the separation is exactly compensated by an entropy increase due to expansion" (Shenker, 1999, 45) . The thermodynamic entropy, according to Shenker, only changes between 4 → 5. Thermodynamic entropy and von Neumann entropy therefore differ in their behaviour since a reduction in thermodynamic entropy takes place at stage 5, as opposed to the reduction of von Neumann entropy at stage 4. Henderson (2003) points out several shortcomings in Shenker's argument that explain the alleged discrepancy. She shows that the system at stage 4 cannot be considered to be in a pure state as the gas' spatial degrees of freedom must also be taken into account in addition to its spin degrees of freedom. The initial state of the system at stage 1 is then given by |Φ ⊗ ρ β , where ρ β is the thermal state of the system in contact with a heat bath at inverse temperature β. The entropy change at stage 2 is then only due to the entropy change of the spin degrees of freedom. Furthermore, even if we assume collapse, as Shenker implicitly does, the entropy is still high, since "we lack knowledge of which pure state the system is in" (Henderson, 2003, 294, original emphasis) . The separation step at stage 2 → 4 then only 'labels' the states in so far as they are associated with a particular spatial area of the box, but this step does not change the entropy. The change in entropy at the compression stage 5 is then due to a change of the entropy of the spatial degrees of freedom.
Modern Criticism by Hemmo and Shenker (2006)
In a subsequently published, revised and amended version, Hemmo and Shenker (2006) offer an amended proposal with a similar but slightly weakened claim. They assert that "von Neumann's argument does not establish a conceptual link between −Tr[ρ ln ρ] and the thermodynamic quantity (1/T ) pdV (or dQ/T ) in the single particle gas [...]" (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, p.158, emphasis added) . They therefore retain their position that the von Neumann entropy cannot be empirically equivalent to the phenomenological entropy, but restrict this inequivalence to the domain of single or sufficiently few particles. Von Neumann and thermodynamic entropy, they argue, are effectively equivalent only in the thermodynamic limit.
This section will discuss Shenker's and Hemmo and Shenker's (H&S) efforts to show dissimilar behaviour between the two entropies and reveal that their argument is problematic to the extent that it allows for pepetua mobile of the second kind. The source of error will be identified to be the failure to take into account the entropy contribution of the measurement apparatus. As was already demonstrated by Szilard (1929) and his famous one-particle engine, measurement based correlations with an external agent cannot be ignored in the single particle limit, as otherwise it would be possible to violate the second law of thermodynamics. Once the entropy contribution of the measurement apparatus is taken into account, however, the analogous behaviour of thermodynamic entropy and von Neumann entropy for the joint system is restored 6 .
I assume, just like H&S, that it is in fact possible to treat a single quantum particle as a genuine thermodynamic system.
The following argument, including any conceptual ambiguities, has been taken unamended from (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006 ). An illustration of the steps can be found in Figure 2 .
Step 1 (Preparation I): A quantum particle is prepared in a spin-up eigenstate in the x-direction, |+ x P . Its coarse-grained initial location is given by ρ(L) P , where the subscripts L and R will refer to its position in either the left or the right part of the box. The measuring apparatus M starts out in the state |Ready M . The initial state of the particle is hence given by the product state:
Step 2 (Preparation II): In Step 2, a measurement in the spin z direction is performed, leading to an entanglement of the measurement apparatus' pointer states and the z spin Figure 2 : Illustration of the Gedankenexperiment following Hemmo and Shenker (2006) . (1) the particle is prepared in a spin-x up eigenstate.
(2) A spin-z measurement is performed on the particle.
(3) Depending on the outcome, the particle is moved to the right side of the box or remains in the left side via semi-permeable membranes. (4) A location measurement is performed.
(5) The empty side of the box is compressed. (6) & (7) The system is brought back to its original state.
eigenstates. It is important to note that H&S do not specify the nature of the measurement at this stage, i.e. whether they are working in a collapse or no-collapse model. The state of the system is given by
The reduced density matrix of the quantum system becomes:
which, as H&S state, "in some interpretations may be taken to describe our ignorance of the z spin of P" (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, p.160) .
Whereas the von Neumann entropy of the spin component S vN = −Tr[ρ ln ρ] was zero before, it now becomes positive. The thermodynamic entropy however, the authors assert, remains the same.
Step 3 (Separation): Two semi-permeable membranes are inserted and moved through the box in a way that the particle remains on the left iff it is in state |+ z but is moved to the right iff it is in state |− z . There is no work cost involved in this process and neither von Neumann entropy nor thermodynamic entropy change during this step, during which the spatial degrees of freedom are coupled to the spin degrees of freedom.
Step 4 (Measurement): As we are only considering a single molecule in this setup as opposed to von Neumann's original many particle gas, the compression stage needs to be preceded by a location measurement in order to determine which part of the box is empty. H&S therefore introduce a further measurement before compression (not present in von Neumann's original argument), in order to determine in which part of the box the particle is located.
H&S add that for the calculation of the von Neumann entropy, collapse and no-collapse interpretations will now have to use different expressions for the quantum state. In collapse theories, the state as a result of the location measurement collapses into either
For no-collapse interpretations on the other hand, the system's state is given by the reduced density matrix:
The thermodynamic entropy, S T D , as the authors stress, is not influenced by the position measurement and does not change during this step, in the sense-presumably-that no heat flows into, or out, of the system in consequence of this measurement . By contrast they urge, whether the von Neumann entropy changes, depends on whether we consider collapse or no-collapse interpretations. In the case of collapse interpretations the von Neumann entropy of the system allegedly decreases, whereas in the case of no-collapse interpretations, it remains the same.
Step 5 (Compression): An isothermal compression of the box back to its original volume V is performed. The change in thermodynamic entropy during this step is normally given by S T D = (1/T ) pdV , however, since there is no work involved in the compression against the vacuum, H&S argue, the thermodynamic entropy does not change at
Step 5. In fact, the thermodynamic entropy does not change throughout the whole experiment, the authors claim.
Step 6 (Return to Initial State): The system is brought back to its initial state by unitary transformations with no entropy cost. " [...] [T]he measuring device need also be returned to its initial ready state. One can do that unitarily." (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, 161) .
H&S's main criticism thereby focuses on the fact that the thermodynamic entropy remains constant throughout the experiment, whereas the von Neumann entropy does not:
Therefore, whatever changes occur in Trρ ln ρ during the experiment, they cannot be taken to compensate for (1/T ) pdV since the latter is null throughout the experiment. (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, p.162) 
Discussion of Hemmo and Shenker's (2006) Argument
This section will discuss the results presented above. I will identify two shortcomings in the argument. The first concerns a wrong calculation of the von Neumann entropy during the Step 4 location measurement. The second regards the unitary reset of the measurement apparatus. If such unitary reset were indeed possible, then both the traditional and a probabilistic version of the second law would be violated.
Redundancy of the Step 4 Location Measurement
I begin the discussion with some general observations that will provide useful later on and will bring some more clarity to the argument. For Hemmo and Shenker, the only difference between their and von Neumann's original thought experiment is that a further measurement, a location measurement (Step 4), is needed to determine the molecule's location prior to the compression stage. For gases at the thermodynamic limit, this measurement becomes redundant, since the amount of molecules on each side of the box becomes proportional to their respective occupying volume. Not so for single molecules, for which, before the empty side of the box can be compressed (with probability one), a location measurement is required in order to determine which side the particle is on.
Contrary to H&S's assertions, however, the location measurement during Step 4 is not needed. A spin z measurement already took place at Step 2 and the outcome of this measurement will be fully correlated with the position of the particle after the separation in Step 3. And so instead of introducing yet another auxiliary system that performs a location measurement on the particle, it would have been sufficient to read out the measurement result of the spin z measurement.
In the case of collapse, for example, the particle will have already collapsed into a spin eigenstate during the Step 2 measurement. The correlations established during the location measurement will thereby all be classical and reading out the spin-measurement result is sufficient to predict the particle's location after the separation. In the case of no-collapse interpretations and ignoring the system's spatial degrees of freedom and decoherence, system and (spin-)measurement apparatus become entangled during Step 2:
During the separation in Step 3, whether or not the system is to be found the state of the box, namely whether it contains a molecule in the left compartment |L B or in the right compartment |R B then also becomes entangled with the spin degrees of freedom of the molecule, which means that the state of the particle-apparatus-box system is
Therefore, for both collapse and no-collapse cases it is in fact sufficient to read out the measurement result of the Step 2 spin measurement in order to determine the location of the particle after the separation process.
Having two instead of one measurement(s) would not be much of a problem, if it weren't the case that for H&S, the two measurements have different consequences for the von Neumann entropy. This depicts a first inconsistency in their argument: whereas H&S agree that after the spin z measurement at Step 2 the post spin measurement density matrix of the particle is given by
they do not apply the same reasoning to the post location measurement state of the system at Step 4. Instead, they use a 'collapsed' density matrix to calculate the von Neumann entropy:
In the first case, the (spin) measurement has therefore increased the entropy, whereas in the second case the (location) measurement has effectively reduced it. What is going on?
Let me first try to assemble what the authors themselves could have had in mind. In von Neumann's original argument, the Step 2 spin measurement is non-selective 7 , which means that even if the system has de facto collapsed into one of its eigenstates, an external agent 8 would not be able to determine into which state the system has collapsed and would therefore describe the system by a density matrix ρ (2,red) . The system would be in a so-called proper mixture, meaning that it is possible to understand ρ as representing a probability distribution over pure states 9 . The von Neumann entropy of the system at Step 2 has thereby increased compared to its previous state, in agreement with what von Neumann considers being the irreversibility of a 'Prozess 1'.
The
Step 4 location measurement on the other hand is selective -it establishes correlations between the agent who performs the measurement 10 and the system. These correlations then allow the agent to perform further operations on the system, such as the
Step 5 compression of the box. For H&S, the von Neumann entropy of the system at Step 4 has therefore decreased from Step 3.
Since H&S want to include the non-selective spin-measurement at Step 2, the Step 4 location measurement is indeed a necessary requirement for the single particle case, given that the compression is not being allowed to be conditional on the outcome of the Step 2 measurement. Without the selective measurement, the work-free compression against vacuum could not take place. The limiting case of infinite particles (and in fact von Neumann's original account) does not require this selective measurement since the amount of particles within each chamber of the box becomes equal.
The problem with including a second measurement on the system is that this second measurement also introduces a second measurement apparatus. It will be shown shortly that H&S's conclusion is based on an erroneous calculation of the von Neumann entropy when the system is correlated to this second measurement apparatus. Before elaborating on this point however, I would like to discuss another shortcoming of their argument. And, given that it allows us to arbitrarily violate the second law, a severe one moreover.
Violation of the Second Law
H&S notably claim that the thermodynamic entropy change is zero throughout the whole cycle and in particular, that at the end of the cycle "[...] the measuring device [can be returned to its initial ready state] unitarily." (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, p.161) , and hence without any heat cost.
To see why this better not be the case, we consider the consequences of H&S's assertions and assume that it is indeed possible to reset the measurement apparatus without a compensating heat transfer into the environment (against Landauer's principle (Landauer, 1961; Bennett, 1973) ). We may then construct a slightly amended version of H&S's proposed cycle. No big changes are made, the only thing that changes is
Step 5, which instead of being a compression we turn into an isothermal expansion. This means that instead of compressing the empty side against the vacuum, we let the particle push against the partition in a quasi-static, isothermal fashion. Given that the position of the particle is 'known' as a result of the location measurement, it is possible to attach a weight to the partition, thereby extracting kT ln 2 units of work from the system during the expansion, while the according amount of heat is delivered from the heat reservoir.
After the work extraction, the measurement apparatus is brought back to its initial state (which according to H&S can be done for free). The partition is then re-inserted into the original system (for free), the position of the particle measured again (for free) and the above process is repeated, thereby extracting arbitrarily large amounts of work from this one-particle engine with the sole effect being that heat is extracted from a single reservoir. But this is a direct violation of the Kelvin-Planck statement of the second law (Planck, 1991) . Something must have gone wrong!
The problem lies in the assumption that the measurement device can be returned to its initial ready-state unitarily. This does not work and mathematically, it can be easily seen why not: since the measurement device after the measurement is in one of the two mutually exclusive states |− M or |+ M , there exist no unitary operator that reliably maps the memory cell back to its initial, ready state {|− M , |+ M } → |ready M . In order to reset the measurement device unitarily, it is necessary to record beforehand, in which one of the two states the device is in. This, however, would require a further measurement of yet another measuring device on the first, which by the end of the cycle equally needs to be reset. To do so unitarily, a third measurement device would be needed and so on.
Eventually, one runs out of resources and a (non-unitary) erasure becomes unavoidable. A unitary reset of the memory cell is hence not possible. It is furthermore worth mentioning that in a more generalised account, Ladyman et al. (2008) show that in fact any violation of Landauer's principle may be used for a violation of the second law.
Once the heat cost associated with the resetting operation is taken into account, the complete cycle ceases to be thermodynamically entropy neutral, as the entropy in the environment will have increased in the last step.
H&S cannot get around conceding to this point if they want their argument to persist. They (at least for the purpose of their paper) agree with von Neumann that [...] in the sense of phenomenological thermodynamics, each conceivable process constitutes valid evidence, provided that it does not conflict with the two fundamental laws of thermodynamics." (von Neumann, 1996, p.192) 
Allowing for a dissipationless reset of the memory cell could in principle violate the second law 12 and therefore stands in clear conflict with thermodynamics. Problematic as this is on its own, the issue is amplified by the objective of H&S's article, which is to show that the thermodynamic entropy differs in behaviour from von Neumann's entropy. But if the cycle is not even thermodynamically consistent (i.e. disobeys the laws), then how could it possibly be used to compare the von Neumann entropy with the thermodynamic entropy?
Which Entropy?
Notwithstanding the above criticism, H&S's main point that the von Neumann entropy (as opposed to the thermodynamic entropy) during the Step 4 location measurement decreases, and that this gives us reason to reject their conceptual equivalence, still stands, or seems to.
As a result of the location measurement, the von Neumann entropy decreases back to its original value. (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, p.163) In this section I will discuss their claim and in particular I will show that:
(i) The physically relevant entity is the joint entropy of system and measurement apparatus. It remains the same.
(ii) It is the system's so-called conditional entropy that decreases during the measurement, not the system's marginal von Neumann entropy.
In phenomenological thermodynamics, the joint entropy of two systems is always the sum of their respective entropies. The von Neumann (in the classical case the Gibbs-) entropy on the other hand is generally subadditive and additive only in the absence of correlations between two systems:
where S stands for 'system' and M stands for 'measurement apparatus' or 'memory cell'.
In the concrete case of the Step 4 location measurement, we can model the measurement apparatus M as a box containing a single molecule and divided by a partition. It can then be in one of two mutually exclusive states, corresponding to the position of the molecule, left (l) or right (r). We assume it needs to be in a 'ready'-state before the measurement, which we chose to be l. For simplicity, we assign an entropy of zero to it. If we consider the case of collapse, at the time of the measurement the system will have already collapsed into a spin eigenstate. The correlations between the location of the system and the measurement apparatus are then all essentially classical and the von Neumann entropy before the measurement can be rewritten as:
where p(s) is the probability of the system being in the left or right chamber of the box.
Before the Step 4 location measurement, system and measurement apparatus are not correlated, and their joint entropy is given by H 3 (S, M ) = H 3 (S) + H 3 (M ), where 3 is taken to denote 'Stage 3', or, in other words, 'before the Step 4 measurement'. During the measurement, the memory cell will align itself with the position of the particle and the two systems become correlated. The joint entropy now cannot be expressed anymore as the sum of the individual entropies and instead becomes
with H(S|M ) being the so-called conditional entropy, which quantifies how much S is correlated with M and which is given by (12) reduces to Equation (10). It is often considered to be the entropy relative to an agent (in this case the measurement apparatus).
Let us now go back to H&S's claim that the von Neumann entropy of the system decreases during the location measurement. Does it? The answer is no. What decreases, however, is the conditional entropy relative to the measurement apparatus:
It reduces to zero, because system and measurement apparatus become perfectly correlated during the measurement. And so when H&S claim that the system's entropy has decreased, what they mean is that the system's conditional entropy has decreased. But the conditional entropy is distinct from the marginal entropy. Re-writing the joint entropy of system and measurement apparatus demonstrates this:
As opposed to phenomenological thermodynamics, which treats systems as black boxes, (classical and quantum) statistical mechanics is able to detect correlations between subsystems, allowing us to mathematically handle the concept of 'measurement' in the first place. If we associate entropy with the potential to (reliably) extract work from a system, then the conditional entropy certainly quantifies this ability to a certain extent: a memory cell endowed with an automaton would now be able to (reliably) extract work from the system by allowing it to isothermally expand into the other half of the box, thereby raising a weight. Contrary to an external agent who is not correlated to the particle location. But this is just the ordinary Maxwell's demon scenario 13 applied to a one-particle setting (Szilard, 1929) .
What becomes important for thermodynamic treatments in such a setting, is the joint entropy of system and measurement apparatus, as the joint system (ideally) has no correlations with the outside and can thus be treated as a thermodynamic black box. And it turns out that the behaviour of the thermodynamic entropy of the joint system, is exactly mirrored by the behaviour of the von Neumann entropy: the joint entropy of system and measurement apparatus does not change during the location measurement, but remains the same:
And so, to summarise the above: all that changes during the location measurement is the conditional entropy, but neither the joint entropy of the system nor the marginal entropy H(S). Furthermore, the joint entropy, just as the thermodynamic entropy of the joint system, remain the same during the location measurement.
No Collapse Scenarios
Let us now consider the case of no collapse scenarios. In no collapse scenarios, following the measurement in Step 4, the measurement apparatus and the location degree of freedom become entangled. The reduced density matrix after tracing out the decohering environment therefore is given by an inproper mixture due to the neglect of the correlations with the environment. After the Step 4 measurement, the density matrix of the combined system and measurement apparatus is given by
where now |L M and |R M represent the states of the measurement apparatus. The correlations between the measurement apparatus and the system are of a classical nature and so also in the absence of collapse, the von Neumann entropy of system and apparatus has not changed during the Step 4 measurement.
being" (as cited in (Maxwell, 1995) ), which was intended to demonstrate that the orthodox second law of thermodynamics could be broken in principle by exploiting fluctuations. In the thought experiment, a box filled with monoatomic gas is divided into two parts by a partition into which a small door is inbuilt. The "being", later called Maxwell's demon, controls every atom that approaches the door and either lets the atom pass or not. Since the gas molecules are subject to a velocity distribution, he can decide to only let the fast molecules pass into the one direction and to only let slow molecules pass into the other direction. By doing so the demon creates a temperature gradient, allowing him to violate the second law.
What would have been von Neumann's Response?
After the above discussion, one may speculate about what von Neumann himself might have thought of H&S's claim that his reasoning does not establish a conceptual link between von Neumann entropy and thermodynamic entropy. Chances are he would not have accepted their conclusion. This section elaborates why.
In his original setup, von Neumann introduced a gas consisting of individual quantum systems, locked up in boxes and placed in a further, larger box -a setup that first proposed by Einstein (1914) . Von Neumann has in mind a representative, imaginary statistical (but finite) ensemble (Gesamtheit 14 ). For him, the density operator (which he calls the 'statistical operator') can only relate to such a Gesamtheit. This means that even in the case of an individual quantum system, von Neumann's argument would remain unchanged: the density operator of this individual quantum system would still relate to an ensemble of systems and a system containing a single particle would therefore still be modeled as an N particle ensemble. The statistical representations of a) a system containing a single particle, and b) a system containing many particles, are therefore identical. And so chances are that von Neumann would have rejected H&S's discussion on the basis of a misunderstanding of the statistical operator itself.
For von Neumann, entropy quantifies an observer's epistemic capacities, both in the classical and in the quantum case, in which this ignorance refers to ignorance about which pure state the system is in.
The temporal variations of the entropy are due to the fact that the observer does not know everything, or rather that he cannot determine (measure) everything, that is in principle measurable. (von Neumann, 1996, p.213) 15 The problems with such ignorance interpretations are manifold. For one, we need to distinguish between proper and improper mixtures. In case the mixtures are improper, that is in case they arise from tracing out the degrees of freedom of an entangled subsystem, the system cannot be thought of as being in one or the other pure state with a given probability and we cannot use the density matrix as a measure of ignorance. Von Neumann however does not consider this case.
In the case of a proper mixture, the density matrix actually can be given an ignorance interpretation over pure states, which is what von Neumann does. However, since the decomposition of the density matrix is highly non-unique, i.e. since there are many different ensembles with different eigenstates and different probabilities that give rise to one and the same density matrix, the density matrix loses its appeal as being an ignorance measure over pure states here as well. In the particular case of von Neumann's argument, however, we may actually get away with this latter version in the case of a collapse interpretation, since the Gesamtheit has been prepared to be composed of a specific set of eigenvectors.
To conclude and summarise the above: within the framework of von Neumann's Gesamtheit interpretation, his argument is immune to the criticism by H&S, even though such an interpretation ought to be rejected on independent grounds.
Conclusion
This article took a closer look at von Neumann's historical argument in favour of the von Neumann entropy. It was shown that the criticism by Shenker (1999) and Hemmo and Shenker (2006) is problematic because a) their reasoning allows for a perpetuum mobile and b) the alleged decrease in entropy during the Step 4 location measurement is in fact a decrease in conditional entropy. The relevant entropy, the joint entropy of system and measurement apparatus, remains unchanged during the location measurement.
